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A theory of land market activity is developed for settings where there is uncertainty
and private information about the security of land tenure. Land sellers match with
buyers in a competitive search environment, and an illiquid land market emerges as
a screening mechanism. As a consequence, adverse selection and an insecure system
of property rights stie land market transactions. The implications of the theory are
tested using household level data from Indonesia. As predicted, formally titled land is
more liquid than untitled land in the sense that ownership rights are more readily trans-
ferable. Additional implications of the theory are veried empirically by constructing
a proxy variable for land tenure security and studying the dierences between markets
for unregistered land across Indonesian provinces. Regional land market activity is
appropriately linked to the distribution of the proxy variable.
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11 Introduction
In this paper I construct a theory of land market activity in settings where land tenure is
insecure. I argue that dierences in the security of property rights over land can help explain
the widely varied volumes of trade across developing country land markets. The framework
establishes that asymmetric information about land tenure insecurity can reduce the volume
of transactions in a land lease or sales market. As a useful application of the model, I analyze
the eect of the performance of the land market on workers' migration decisions. Thinness in
the land market can prevent the ecient allocation of workers between the farm and o-farm
sectors.
It is a widely held view that systems of property rights have important eects on the
functioning of agricultural land markets. In particular, policies that improve tenure secu-
rity are often argued to improve land transferability and hence strengthen a landowner's
capacity to capitalize on the value of his land should he decide to migrate or accept o-
farm employment (Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998; Vranken and Swinnen, 2006). This is
of economic importance because the process of economic development typically involves a
shift in labour from agricultural sectors to more modern manufacturing or service sectors.
Workers' incentives for making the transition partly depend on the functioning of the rural
land market.
The main theoretical contribution of the paper is establishing the link between tenure
security and land market activity. It is the hidden information about the security of land
ownership that renders land illiquid. The transferability of a particular plot is determined
endogenously by the number of land market participants. A low buyer-seller ratio implies
a low probability of selling or leasing out land, which acts as a screening mechanism that
allows the demand side of the market to determine the quality of the property rights. The
endogenous mechanism is incentive compatible because owners of relatively secure land are
willing to accept a lower probability of trade if payment is more favourable in the event of
a land transfer.
2To evaluate the predictions of the model, I present empirical evidence using household
level data from Indonesia. As the model predicts, owners of rural land parcels are more
active in the supply side of the land market if their land is registered. Approximately 17
percent of unregistered landowners supplied land to the market, while over 25 percent of
certicate holders supplied some or all of their farmland to the market. This is consistent
with the theory given that possession of a legal land certicate improves ownership security,
and access to a land registry reduces the asymmetry of information. The data also suggest
a link between the operation of the land market and non-farm business activity and labour
force participation. Rural households with land certicates are more likely to have mem-
bers earning wages in a non-agricultural sector compared to households with unregistered
land. More rigorous analyses with dierence-in-dierence estimation and probit models sup-
port these relationships. Additional implications of the theory are empirically validated by
constructing a proxy variable for land tenure security and studying the dierences between
markets for untitled land across Indonesian provinces.
This paper is related to a large literature on the importance of a well-dened and secure
system of property rights over land. The literature has focused on several benets of tenure
security and well-functioning land markets: (i) the appropriate incentives for landowners to
engage in long-term productivity enhancing investments (Besley, 1995; Brasselle, Gaspart,
and Platteau, 2002; Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle, 2002; Deininger and Jin, 2006; Fenske, 2010);
(ii) the ability to use land as collateral, thus improving landowners' access to credit (Feder
and Onchan, 1987; Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998); and (iii) the allocation of land to more
productive cultivators (Skouas, 1995; Deininger and Jin, 2005).
In contrast, this paper focuses specically on the role of land transferability in the ecient
allocation of workers between agricultural and o-farm activities. In less developed countries,
infrequent land transfers are often accomplished through inheritance and reallocation by
village leaders. As non-agricultural sectors start to emerge and population densities increase,
so does the need for land sales markets or rental transactions. Accordingly, I model the land
market in an environment where a fraction of landowners receive an opportunity to work
3more productively in a modern sector. With no further need for land as a productive input,
an emigrating landowner could benet from the ability to lease or sell his plot.1
The theory presented here is also related to the household models of land rental markets
with transaction costs (Besley, 1995; Skouas, 1995; Carter and Yao, 2002; Deininger and Jin,
2009). In Deininger and Jin (2005) for example, demand for land transferability is driven by
o-farm employment opportunities and dierences in agricultural ability. By imposing exoge-
nous transaction costs in the land market, illiquidity is introduced in a reduced-form fashion.
An increase in transaction costs results in a larger set of self-cultivating agents not participat-
ing in the market. Deininger and Jin (2005) point to the costly acquisition of information and
the risk of expropriation by village leaders as key determinants of transaction costs. Exactly
how tenure insecurity translates into transaction costs that hamper land market participation
is not modeled. That is, transaction cost models assume rather than explain the crucial deter-
minants of land market inactivity. Recently, there has been a push in the eld of development
economics towards the understanding of underlying mechanisms (Deaton, 2010a,b). This pa-
per lls a gap in the literature by applying a framework that allows one to understand the
mechanism by which tenure insecurity leads endogenously to illiquidity in the land market.2
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the details of the model, Section
3 characterizes the equilibrium, and Section 4 presents the main theoretical results including
eciency implications. Section 5 presents an empirical analysis of land markets in Indonesia
to verify the testable implications of the theory. Section 6 concludes. The proofs are pre-
sented in Appendices A and B. Appendix C outlines the derivation of the proxy variable for
land tenure insecurity. Appendix D presents a variation of the model with land transactions
driven by idiosyncratic shocks to household agricultural productivity.
1A few other papers acknowledge this important dimension of ecient land markets (Yang, 1997; Yao,
2000; Kung, 2002). For example, Yang (1997) uses a static household model to argue that the prohibition
of farmland sales adversely aects the incentives for rural-urban migration, and Kung (2002) estimates a
signicant relationship between the emergence of o-farm labour markets and land rental market activity in
rural China.
2In a dynamic setting, a measure of land activity is the number of transactions within a xed interval of
time. In a static context like the environment studied here, the analogous notion of land market activity or
liquidity is the probability of trade: i.e., the likelihood of selling a particular plot.
42 The Model
There exist two sectors of production: the traditional agricultural sector (the rural economy)
and the emerging o-farm economy with modern sector employment (the urban economy).3
Rural workers match with urban rms before production takes place. Let q be the exogenous
probability that a rural worker receives an urban job oer. The demand for land market
transactions is driven by the potential gains from transferring land from an emigrant to a
rural worker.
There are two periods. The land market is active in the rst period, and production
takes place in the second. In the nal period, landless rural workers earn the wage rate wR,
and urban workers receive wU > wR. A rural landowner earns labour income as well as land
rent, . If a landowner fails to sell (or a lessee fails to transfer his lease), he can maintain
possession of the land even if he accepts employment in the o-farm sector. In this case, the
discounted continuation value of land ownership is ,  2 (0;1). The continuation value
is intended to mimic a dynamic setting, wherein an unsuccessful seller could try again to
transact the following period.4 Migration occurs at the beginning of the second period. A
worker with an urban job oer decides whether or not to accept the job and migrate to the
urban sector. The land market operates when potential emigrants try to transfer their land,
and landless workers are willing to purchase/lease farmland. The model is constructed so
as to be appropriate for both land lease and sales markets, since both buyers and lessees
are exposed to the risk of losing agricultural output. To keep the terminology clear, I
continue with the description of the model in terms of sales markets, even though land lease
agreements are common for transferring farmland in developing countries.
3The sectors may not be separated geographically. The urban sector could therefore refer to the non-
agricultural activity in the rural area.
4In a dynamic context,  can be thought of as the discounted present value of future land rents. Owners
of unsold land lose rent in period two, but can still prot from the value of their land from the end of period
2 onward, . While it is useful to interpret the model in a way that mimics a dynamic version, it will
become clear that a fully dynamic model would be signicantly complicated by the evolving distribution of
land ownership and the possibility of learning under asymmetric information.
5There is a xed number of indivisible farm plots and an initial distribution of landown-
ership among the rural population. To reect tenure insecurity, suppose that the owner of
a plot of land faces a probability  2 (0;1) of losing ownership of the land.5 Therefore, a
rural landowner's total expected income is wR + (1   ) in period two, and an emigrant
landowner earns wU +(1 ) in expectation. Land is heterogeneous in terms of ownership
security.6 There are only two types: less secure land (type L with L 2 (0;1)), and land with
high tenure security (type H with H 2 [0;L)). The rural population, which has measure
N, is made up of landless workers and landowners. For simplicity, households are restricted
to own and operate at most one plot of land. A share nL 2 (0;1) of the rural population
own type L land, and a share nH 2 (0;1) own type H land, with nL + nH < 1. A fraction
1   nL   nH of the rural population consists of ex ante homogeneous landless workers.
The quality of the land title is the landowner's private information. Hence there is
the potential for a situation of adverse selection in the land market (Akerlof, 1970). I
propose a framework with multiple submarkets for agricultural land market participants as an
institution to help overcome the adverse selection problem. Submarkets arise endogenously,
and each one is characterized by the price at which trade occurs in that particular subdivision
of the market. Buyers and sellers observe the set of submarkets and decide in which to
participate. Buyers and sellers meet bilaterally, and land transactions can occur at the
price specic to that submarket. To highlight the mechanism by which adverse selection
and an insecure system of property rights stie land market transactions, I assume there
are no matching frictions. The short side of the market matches with probability one. If,
5The notion of tenure insecurity is often thought of as a random probability of losing ownership rights to
a particular plot of land. This modelling approach is consistent with the evidence of forced appropriations
by local government leaders in rural China (Li, Rozelle, and Brandt, 1998) and the perceived threat of land
reallocations in Ethiopia (Deininger and Jin, 2006). Alternatively,  can be interpreted as the share of land
rent spent on costly land disputes (Deininger and Castagnini, 2006; Holden, Otsuka, and Place, 2009). This
might be appropriate for understanding the litigation costs in Cameroon for example, where title disputes
make up a large number of cases brought before village-level and provincial courts (Firmin-Sellers and Sellers,
1999).
6Institutional dierences across communities can bring about heterogeneous land titles, a phenomenon
which has been documented in terms of land transfer rights in rural China (Liu, Carter, and Yao, 1998). On
the other hand, Deininger, Zegarra, and Lavadenz (2003) observe a variety of legal and informal documents
that convey dierent levels of tenure security in Nicaragua. As is discussed in greater detail in Section 5,
overlapping property rights regimes have brought about heterogeneity in tenure security in Indonesia.
6for example, there are more sellers than buyers in a particular submarket, buyers randomly
select a seller to trade with.
Potential sellers are the landowners with urban job oers: qnLN are type L (owners of
insecure land), and qnHN are type H (own secure land). Sellers can choose not to enter any
submarket when the expected payo is negative. Let SL = qnLN denote the measure of type
L sellers, and SH = qnHN denote the measure of type H sellers. Potential buyers include
all landless workers without outside labour market opportunities, (1   q)(1   nL   nH)N.
Potential buyers enter the land market until the expected benet of doing so is equal to the
entry cost, c.
Assumption 1 q < 1 nL  nH. The measure of non-migrant landless workers is enough
to ensure that the free entry conditions for buyers hold in equilibrium.
Note that the migration decision in period two may depend on land market outcomes in
the previous period. The accept/reject decisions of each type of agent can be characterized
as follows:
1. A landless worker with no opportunity to purchase land will migrate if
w
U   w
R  0: (1)
2. A landless worker with an opportunity to purchase type i rural land at price p, and a
type i landowner with the option of a land sale at price p will migrate if
w
U   w
R  (1   i)   p: (2)
3. A type i landowner with no opportunity to sell land will migrate if
w
U   w
R  (1   )(1   i): (3)
7Migration occurs among the landless whenever there exists an urban-rural wage gap. A
precondition for land market activity is for the price of land, p, to satisfy inequality (2).
Otherwise, landowners would never accept urban employment and there would be no need
for a land market. Finally, if condition (3) holds for i 2 fL;Hg, all urban job oers are
accepted.
A buyer's payo in a land market transaction involving type i land for price p is
(1   i)   p. A type i seller's gain from a land market transaction is
p   maxf(1   i);(1   i)   (w
U   w
R)g (4)
where the last term represents the opportunity cost of the transaction to the seller, and the
maximization operator ensures that expected payos are consistent with optimal migration
decisions. That is, the migration decisions of potential sellers are consistent with conditions
(2) and (3). To simplify the notation, let
i = maxf(1   i);(1   i)   (w
U   w
R)g; for i 2 fL;Hg (5)
represent the type-dependent opportunity costs of land transactions. H > L is an important
property for deriving the results that follow. Choosing not to enter the land market (denoted
by submarket p = ;), yields a payo of zero.
Assumption 2 c < minf(1 )(1 L);wU wRg. The cost of entering the land market,
c, is small enough that expected gains from trade are always positive.7
7The introduction of entry costs is necessary on the demand side of the market whenever
sL(p)(1   L) + sH(p)(1   H)
sL(p) + sH(p)
  p > 0; p 2 P
to pin down the number of buyers in each submarket using the free entry condition. If entry costs are too
high, expected gains from trade can become negative and the land market shuts down. Assumption 2 is a
sucient condition to ensure that a land market exists.
On the supply side of the market, entry costs are unnecessary because there is a xed measure of potential
sellers that enter the market whenever the expected gains from trade are positive. The results are unaected
by the introduction of entry costs on the supply side of the market, except for Proposition 4.3 (see footnote
9, p.16).
83 The Land Market
Denition 3.1 Given a set of submarkets, P, a land market equilibrium is a measure
fb(p)gp2P, and measures fsL(p)gp2P[f;g, and fsH(p)gp2P[f;g such that
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(with equality if b(p) > 0)
2. Sellers enter submarkets optimally: for i = L;H,





































The last part of the denition says that every potential seller either chooses a submarket
or decides not to enter the land market. Part 2 requires that sellers choose optimally between
submarkets. The rst part of the denition says that free entry drives a buyer's expected
payo down to the cost of entering the market. Notice that an equilibrium allocation of
buyers and sellers determines the type-dependent utilities of sellers, f UL;  UHg.
9As previously noted, migration decisions in period two may hinge on land market out-
comes in period one. Accordingly, the opportunity cost of a land transaction reects the
anticipated migration decision. Depending on the parameter values, the environment can be
classied according to the pattern of equilibrium migration decisions. Suppose for example
that all job oers are accepted, even without land market transactions. Call this a case 1
environment. A case 2 environment is one in which only type H landowners who fail to sell
land reject urban job oers. Finally, a case 3 environment manifests when both types of
landowners reject job oers when unable to sell their land. Equilibrium in the land market
can be classied in this manner according to the urban-rural wage gap:
Case 1 if w
U   w
R  (1   )(1   H)




(1   )(1   L);(1   )(1   H)

Case 3 if w
U   w
R < (1   )(1   L)
The equilibrium denition does not impose restrictions on prices (i.e., submarkets) that
do not appear in the land market. Consequently, many sets of prices and allocations of
agents across submarkets satisfy the equilibrium conditions. For instance, an equilibrium
with only one submarket with price p 2 (L;minfH;(1   L)   cg) is an equilibrium with
only a market for type L land: type L sellers choose to enter since p > L; type H sellers
choose not to enter whenever p < H; and buyers choose to enter because p  (1 L)  c.
Type L land is readily sold, since p < (1   L)   c implies b(p) > SL, while type H land
is completely illiquid. Moreover, if p < (1   L)   c, it seems reasonable that the price
would be bid upward, since p0 2 (p;(1   L)   c) would still attract type L sellers and the
deviation would yield a strictly positive payo. To restrict the set of equilibria, consider the
following renement.
Equilibrium Renement 1 The set of submarkets (prices P, and allocations fb(p)gp2P,
fsL(p)gp2P[f;g, and fsH(p)gp2P[f;g) satisfying equilibrium conditions 1, 2, and 3 represents a
competitive search land market equilibrium if, given the associated seller utilities f UL;  UHg,
10there is no deviating oer p0 2 R+nP that yields a strictly positive expected payo to the
subset of buyers bidding p0.
The equilibrium renement turns the land market equilibrium into a competitive search
equilibrium like that of Moen (1997), but extended to a setting with asymmetric information.
The framework is similar to that developed in Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010), but
without the standard single-crossing condition. In other words, there is no sorting variable
allowing buyers to attract type H sellers without also attracting type L sellers. Instead,
there is a trade-o between the probability of trade and the price of land that endogenously
sorts sellers into submarkets. As in other models of competitive search, there is the implicit
restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs that agents correctly anticipate the ratio of buyers
to sellers in all possible submarkets, not just those that appear in equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a unique competitive land mar-
ket equilibrium with
1. land prices: pL = (1   L)   c and pH = (1   H)   c
2. seller allocations: fsL(pL);sL(pH)g = fSL;0g and fsH(pL);sH(pH)g = f0;SHg
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R < (1   )(1   H)
In a full information benchmark economy, there is no illiquidity in the land market:
b(pi) = Si for i 2 fL;Hg. In an equilibrium with asymmetric information, however,
b(pH) < SH, implying that there are too few land market transactions in the type H sub-
market. Some type H landowners with valuable urban job oers fail to sell their land.
In the presence of adverse selection due to private information regarding tenure insecurity,
type H land plots are made illiquid as a screening mechanism. The illiquidity arises because
too few buyers enter the market for type H land. The mechanism functions appropriately
because type L landowners prefer a liquid market in order to avoid being stuck with an
insecure land title when production takes place. Type L sellers will therefore enter submarket
pL in order to sell more readily, albeit at a lower price. On the other hand, type H owners
are more likely to maintain ownership of their land if they fail to sell. Sellers of secure land
are therefore more willing to accept a lower probability of trade if it means a chance at
receiving a fair price.
4 The Eects of the Property Rights System
In this section I analyze how changes to the system of property rights aect the functioning of
the land market and the allocation of workers across sectors. Let L = +" and H =  ".
Since all type L sellers trade in equilibrium and only a fraction H  b(pH)=SH 2 (0;1)
of type H sellers trade, the total number of land market transactions is SL + HSH. The
following proposition summarizes the linkages between the system of land rights (governed
by parameters  and ") and the functioning of the land market in terms of the number of
transactions.
12Proposition 4.1 Equilibrium comparative statics with respect to the system of ownership
rights over land imply the following:
(i) A deterioration of land tenure security undermines the transferability of land:
@H
@
 0; (strict for high values of )




The rst result describes the eect of a change in (unweighted) average land tenure se-
curity on the rural land market. As average land tenure insecurity increases, it becomes
more likely that a case 1 or case 2 land market emerges; i.e., it becomes less likely that
land market outcomes inuence subsequent migration decisions. Once this is the case, type
H land plots become less liquid, and land market activity declines. This is an important
but intuitive result. It says that tenure security makes it easier for households to conduct
land market transactions. The relationship between land market activity and the security
of landowner rights supplements the existing literature on the importance of property rights
in land markets. While other researchers focus on the impact of tenure insecurity on in-
centives for investment and the ability to use land as collateral (Besley, 1995; Place and
Migot-Adholla, 1998; Brasselle, Gaspart, and Platteau, 2002; Deininger and Jin, 2006), I
emphasize its eect on land transferability. Establishing the link between tenure insecurity
and the equilibrium volume of transactions in a land market is one of the main theoretical
contributions of the paper. Note that without private information, the security of ownership
would not aect the number of land sales.8
The second part of Proposition 4.1 describes how a land market is adversely aected
by the variability in land title quality. Greater dispersion in land tenure security (the is)
8Under perfect information, changes in the  parameters would aect equilibrium prices, but markets
would clear for any fL;Hg distribution.
13makes it more dicult for landowners with more secure property rights to trade. Substantial
dierences in tenure security between plots renders the information asymmetry problem more
severe. Land market transactions are rare in such environments because the ratio of buyers
to sellers adjusts as an eective sorting device.
An accessible system of clear property titles allows land market participants to counteract
the eect of tenure uncertainty. It is conceptually possible for a comprehensive land titling
initiative to eliminate the asymmetric information problem altogether. A complete and
widespread system of property titles in conjunction with a mechanism for land dispute
resolution could avoid the manifestation of illiquidity as a screening device if potential buyers
can access records of conclusive land title at a low cost. Even when land registration is less
comprehensive, land reforms are likely to have several intermediate eects. For example,
land legislative reforms should help reduce the incidence and cost of land disputes, as well
as reduce the probability of losing ownership due to forced land takings. Proposition 4.1(i)
therefore supports land titling initiatives and other land reforms if the aim is to increase
the transferability of land via enhanced security of landownership. In addition, land titling
eorts should reduce the dierences in land tenure security across plots, which is more
symptomatic of informal institutions with complex systems of customary land rights. A
formal land title is more likely to pin down the property rights for all owners of registered
plots, especially if land registration involves a cadastral map. Proposition 4.1(ii) would then
imply reinforced land transferability as a result of the reduction in uncertainty surrounding
tenure security. These arguments are supported empirically in Section 5 with estimates of
land market participation for owners of registered and unregistered land.
4.1 Eciency
Ineciencies in the land market distort workers' migration decisions and lead to an inecient
allocation of agents across sectors. The ow of workers from farm to o-farm employment
stalls when sellers face a low probability of a successful land transaction. From a labour
allocation point of view, all urban job oers should be accepted whenever wU   wR > c.
14This ecient allocation of agents across sectors only occurs in a case 1 equilibrium. The
case 1 outcome is ecient in this sense only because the urban wage is so high that the land
market becomes irrelevant to the migration decision. In case 2 and case 3 environments,
only a fraction b(pH)=SH < 1 of job oers received by type H landowners are accepted in
equilibrium. Migration ows are therefore sub-optimal whenever wU wR < (1 )(1 H).
Illiquidity in the land market enables buyers to distinguish between the types of land
plots. It allows plots of all types (at least some plots of each type) to be traded in equilib-
rium even in an environment with tenure insecurity and adverse selection. The endogenous
screening mechanism therefore partly corrects for market failure, moving the equilibrium
closer to the full information benchmark: an equilibrium where all benecial land transac-
tions take place. In certain situations, however, it's possible that the ineciencies that arise
from screening outweigh the benets of treating both types distinctly. As Guerrieri, Shimer,
and Wright (2010) show, a pooling allocation can Pareto dominate the separating compet-
itive search equilibrium. This occurs when there are not too many insecure plots. In other
words, the land market equilibrium might not be constrained Pareto ecient. Proposition
4.2 summarizes the eciency results.
Proposition 4.2 The equilibrium labour ow from agricultural to o-farm sectors is inef-
ciently low whenever the wage gap is not too large; that is, if
w
U   w
R < (1   )(1   H):
The competitive land market equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal if the proportion of





> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
(1   )(1   H)   c
(1   H)   (1   L)   c
if case 1
wU   wR   c
(1   H)   (1   L)   c
if case 2
wU   wR   c
wU   wR + (L   H)   c
if case 3
15The next proposition describes how a land market might not function at all if land tenure
becomes too insecure, or the information asymmetry becomes too extreme. Intuitively,
the land market shuts down when the risk of land appropriation drives the gains from
trade to zero. Interestingly, even when there are gains from transferring the relatively more
secure land, all land transactions can be rendered infeasible because the screening mechanism
unravels when the gains from trading the least secure land fall to zero.9
Proposition 4.3 If land tenure becomes too insecure, such that  rises above the threshold
  
(1   ")(1   )   c
(1   )
;
the land market shuts down completely. Moreover, a high degree of heterogeneity in land
rights, ", restricts the range of  for which a land market can operate.
Proposition 4.3 oers an explanation as to why land markets have failed to emerge in some
developing countries. Low tenure security and asymmetric information might also explain
why administrative land reallocations are sometimes used to transfer land when land sales
markets are absent and the incidence of rental activity is low.
This result is related to other studies of asset markets in settings with private informa-
tion. Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) show that an entire asset market can shut down
when the gains from trading the bad asset fall below zero. Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright
(2009) construct an environment with information frictions in which some assets become
non-transferable when the seller cannot recognize their quality. Chiu and Koeppl (2010)
model a nancial asset market using search theory in a setting with adverse selection and
show that the market \freezes" when the average quality of the asset falls below a certain
threshold.
9When both buyers and sellers pay entry costs to participate in the land market, the market for secure
land can shut down before the entire market collapses. This is because the cost of illiquidity can dominate
the gains from trade in the type H market, while type L land continues to be readily transferable.
165 Evidence from Indonesian Land Markets
I test whether registered ownership is associated with a higher incidence of land market
participation using an interesting micro dataset from Indonesia. Then, I present a descriptive
analysis of the link between the degree of tenure security and the transferability of land
among unregistered landowners. The Indonesian data is particularly appropriate because of
the way the government is implementing its land registry program. Indonesian farmland is
being titled in a sporadic manner so that land with varying degrees of tenure security are
spread across the country, rather than having land certicates concentrated in specic areas.
This provides a useful environment for examining the link between tenure security and land
market participation.
5.1 Background
Over the past few decades, population growth, declining land fertility, and the conversion
of agricultural land for non-farm utilization have made it more dicult for farming house-
holds in Indonesia to cultivate enough land to achieve a sucient standard of living. Well-
functioning land markets could allow households to seize o-farm labour market opportu-
nities and transfer land to those who remain. As I have argued in this paper, land tenure
insecurity and an ill-dened system of property rights over land reduce the scope of market
transactions.
The system of land ownership rights in rural Indonesia exhibits many of the salient
features of the theoretical model described above, including the following:
Land Tenure Insecurity: Sources of tenure insecurity in Indonesia include under-compensated
land conscation by governments and frequent land disputes. Land disputes among rural
residents arise because of ill-dened boundary denitions, a complex system of land rights,
and overlapping land deeds.
17Heterogeneous Land Titles: Indonesia's complicated system of land rights is the result
of colonial governments instituting statutory law when land titles under traditional (adat)
law already existed. The Basic Agrarian Law (Undang-undang Pokok Agraria/UUPA) of
1960 was established to unify both the traditional and the statutory land laws. The UUPA
recognizes a variety of land rights, the most secure of which is Hak Milik, or the right of
perpetual ownership and use.
Asymmetric Information: Article 19 of the UUPA states the government's intention
to register all land in the Republic of Indonesia. The purpose of the land registry is not
only to protect the rights of landowners and users, but also to make available land right
information for potential buyers, banks, real estate rms, and other interested individuals
or organizations. As of 2006, however, only 36 percent of land had been registered, or about
34 million land certicates issued (Risnarto, 2009). Until all land is registered, land title
under customary law and land transactions of unregistered land are still recognized. Informal
transfers are acknowledged in the court system but rely on private conveyances and possibly
the testimony of a witness of the land transaction. \Private conveyancing is inecient and
potentially dangerous since it can be subject to fraud as there is no easy proof that the
vendor is the true owner" (Walijatun and Grant, 1996).
An overview of the empirical section of the paper is as follows. First I describe the In-
donesian data. Then I outline the empirical methods used to study the relationship between
the possession of a land certicate and a farmer's participation in the land market on the
supply side. Comparing the land market participation of registered landowners and owners
without legal documentation reveals to what extent tenure insecurity and asymmetric infor-
mation inuence the volume of land market transactions. To investigate further, I analyze
the land market participation of unregistered owners using a proxy variable for tenure inse-
curity. By exploiting regional dierences in tenure security in rural Indonesia, I nd evidence
to support Proposition 4.1; specically, I nd that regional land markets tend to be more
active when tenure security is high (on average) and when there is minimal heterogeneity in
tenure security across plots.
185.2 Data
The data used in the analysis come from the 2000 and 2007 rounds of the Indonesian Family
Life Survey (IFLS). The IFLS is a longitudinal household panel dataset that began in 1993,
but has expanded after four rounds to to cover over 15,000 households in 13 of the 27 Indone-
sian provinces. The surveys cover standard household and individual level characteristics,
farm assets, labour earnings, and land use data. The IFLS collects additional community
level information about land use and o-farm sectors. Only the most recent survey directly
asked landowners about land certicates. Fortunately, respondents were also asked when
the land title/document was obtained, which allows one to determine which households held
land certicates in previous IFLS waves. I use the two most recent cross sections of the IFLS
because of the expanded sample size relative to the rst two waves. Since there are missing
values in the date of certication variable in the most recent survey, most of the econometric
analysis focuses on the 2007 cross section (IFLS4), with one lagged land market variable
from the 2000 wave (IFLS3).
I limit the sample to IFLS households that own farmland. The IFLS sample is large
enough that even after this restriction, 3,607 IFLS4 households and 2,746 IFLS3 households
are left for the analysis. The sales market for land in rural Indonesia is very inactive. Less
than one percent of the sample sold land in the last year. Instead, households conduct land
transactions in the lease market. It could be that rental or prot-sharing arrangements are
preferred when potential buyers are borrowing constrained. Table 1 provides basic descriptive
statistics for the relevant subset of the IFLS4 sample. The data reveal a moderate level
of activity on the supply side of the land lease market: 25.1 percent of households with
land certicates lease out land, while only 16.5 percent of households without formal title
documentation rent out or prot-share land. Conditional on renting out land, the total area
of land rented out does not appear to be constrained for unregistered landowners relative to
registered owners. The data suggest that land market frictions aect the extensive but not
the intensive margin.10
10This is inconsistent with land models with transaction costs proportional to the area rented, as in
19Moreover, households with at least one member operating an o-farm enterprise are
more likely to possess land certicates: 41.1 percent of households with registered land are
involved in non-agriculture business, while only 33.7 percent of unregistered households are
operating businesses in the o-farm economy. Furthermore, households with land certicates
tend to supply more labour to the non-agricultural economy (0.55 members relative to 0.41
members for households with unregistered land). Descriptive statistics therefore illustrate
the linkages between land certication, land market participation, and o-farm economic
activity. One interpretation of the summary evidence is that the owners of registered land
experience greater tenure security and possess credible documentation to convey their secure
ownership. The market for certied land should therefore be more active than the market
for untitled land, allowing farmers with land certicates to lease out land and accept o-farm
employment more readily.
5.3 Empirical Analysis
To investigate the eect of land certicates on supply side land market participation, a
dierence-in-dierence methodology is applied to the IFLS data. In addition to land regis-
tration, one would expect a household's demographic characteristics to aect the decision to
participate in the land market. The age, gender, and educational attainment of the house-
hold head are included as independent variables. To account for market imperfections for
non-land factors of production, the number of adult males and females in the household
are included, as well as the market value of livestock and farm equipment. If land market
transactions are driven by o-farm labour market opportunities as in the theoretical model,
supplying land in the lease market should also be related to the participation of household
members in non-agricultural sectors and the value of non-farm assets. O-farm economic
variables are therefore included as well. Market transactions might correct for an unequal
distribution of land by transferring land from households with large landholdings to house-
(Deininger and Jin, 2005), where land market frictions aect both the participation decision and the amount

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21holds lacking sucient acreage. Accordingly, the area of owned land per household member
is a included among the explanatory variables. Finally, provincial dummy variables are in-
cluded to account for dierences in population densities and the possibility that o-farm







0 + 1(ci  d2007) + 2ci + 3d2007 + 4Xi + 5Yi + 6Zi + 7Pi

; (6)
where i indexes households, yi is an indicator variable for supply side land market partic-
ipation, the s are coecients or vectors of coecients, ci indicates possession of a land
certicate, d2007 is an indicator for the 2007 survey, Xi is a vector of household demographic
characteristics, Yi is a vector of farm-related variables, Zi is a vector of o-farm economic
variables, Pi is a vector of provincial dummies, and  is the standard normal distribution
function.
The variable of interest is ci, which indicates the ownership of registered land. More
specically, ci is a dummy variable for the possession of a land certicate securing the Hak
Milik title. This type of land right is intended to increase tenure security by providing
perpetual ownership, user rights, and transferability. In the context of the theory, land cer-
tication and the presence of an accessible land registry reduce the asymmetric information
problem and eliminate the need for illiquidity as a screening mechanism. Therefore, the
market for registered land should be more active than the market for unregistered land,
since unregistered land is subject to the ineciencies associated with tenure insecurity and
private information.
Rental and prot-sharing arrangements can be long lasting, and past participation in the
land lease market is likely related to the current participation decision. To account for this,
I estimate probit models for the binary decision to lease out land in 2007 (yi in IFLS4, or
y2007i) including the land variable from 2000 (yi in IFLS3, or y2000i) on the right-hand








0 + 1ci + 2y2000i + 3Xi + 4Yi + 5Zi + 6Pi

; (7)
where i indexes households; Xi, Yi, Zi, and Pi are dened as before; and  is the standard
normal distribution function.
5.4 Empirical Findings
The Impact of Land Certication
The land market participation dierence-in-dierence estimation is presented in Table 2.
Since equation (6) is a nonlinear model, the interaction eect can be computed according
to Ai and Norton (2003) so as to avoid misinterpreting the dierence in the land market
outcomes of registered versus unregistered landowners and the statistical signicance of the
result. Applying their method of estimating the magnitude and standard errors of the
interaction eects for the rst specication yields a mean interaction eect of 0:0732 with a
mean z-statistic of 2:46 (signicant at the 95 percent condence level). For the remaining
specications, the estimated mean interaction term is similar in magnitude (between 0:0610
and 0:0675), and the mean z-statistics establish signicance at the 95 percent condence
level. Moreover, for all four specications, the interaction eect is positive for the entire
sample; that is, for all combinations of independent variables that exist in the sample.
The implication of the above is that a household having acquired a legal land title be-
tween the IFLS3 and IFLS4 surveys has a higher propensity to lease out land. This empirical
trend is robust to the inclusion of farm variables (columns (2) and (4)) and non-farm eco-
nomic variables (columns (3) and (4)). Proponents of land certication programs argue that
registered land oers greater tenure security and reduces the asymmetry of information in
land market transactions. The ndings are therefore consistent with the idea that tenure
insecurity and asymmetric information reduce liquidity in land markets. There is no attempt
23to control for the possibility that landowners acquire certicates in anticipation of supply
side land market participation. This would be important if the objective was to evaluate the
impact of exogenous land titling initiatives, as in Holden, Deininger, and Ghebru (2007). Re-
gardless of the direction of causation, the fact that land certicates are associated with more
active land markets supports the notion that tenure insecurity and asymmetric information
aect how easily land transactions can be carried out.
As expected, farm asset ownership is negatively related to land market participation on
the supply side, although household labour endowments are not signicant predictors of
land market participation, except for the number of adult males in column (4). O-farm
business activity, o-farm employment, and non-farm asset ownership are positively related
to leasing out land. These results are in line with the presupposition that the demand
for land market transactions is stimulated by o-farm economic opportunities, as in the
theoretical framework. The size of owned farmland is important in the participation decision,
as households with greater per capita land endowments are more likely to rent out land.
Table 3 presents the comparable estimates from probit regressions for the most recent
cross section of the IFLS, using a binary variable indicating land market participation on
the supply side in 2007. Some of the land rental and prot-sharing arrangements in the
IFLS4 could simply be the continuation of prior arrangements. To account for this, the
land market variable from 2000 (i.e., supply side land market participation in the IFLS3) is
included as an explanatory variable. Past participation is a signicant predictor of current
participation in all four specications. Focusing again on the variable of interest, the probit
results reinforce the ndings from the dierence-in-dierence analysis. Possession of a land
certicate increases the propensity to supply land by 3.3 to 4.3 percentage points.
The dierence-in-dierence and probit results have established a clear link between land
certicates and land market activity. Tenure insecurity, unclear boundary denitions, and
the complexity of the customary system of property rights are preventing unregistered land
from being readily transferred in the rental and sales markets. Acquiring a formal legal
title improves the liquidity of farmland. Further analysis of unregistered land is required to
24establish whether the theoretical model presented in Section 2 is a reasonable representation
of land markets with uncertainty and private information about tenure security.
Tenure Insecurity in the Market for Unregistered Land
The degree of tenure security associated with a particular plot is unobservable. It is precisely
this hidden information that renders land illiquid in order for potential buyers to distinguish
the ownership rights associated with a vendor's plot. Although private information makes
it dicult for econometric analysis, a proxy variable can be backed out of the IFLS data
which, according to the theory, is correlated with the parameters i, for all i. Appendix
C provides the details for the construction of the proxy variable, lambda. Essentially, land
tenure is assumed to be insecure if annual farm output is high relative to the value of the
plot. This is based on the premise that owners of insecure land discount future farm prot
at a higher rate, which lowers their self-assessed valuation of their land. Taking the ratio of
land rent to land value is one way of backing out the degree of ownership insecurity.
Proposition 4.1 can be tested empirically using lambda as a proxy variable for unobserv-
able tenure insecurity. Proposition 4.1(i) describes the negative relationship between average
tenure insecurity and land market activity, while Proposition 4.1(ii) characterizes a negative
relationship between the dispersion of the is and the thickness of the land market. These
implications of the theory can be veried in the IFLS data by exploiting dierences in the
distributions of lambda across regions. Figure 1 displays the disparities between two Indone-
sian regions for unregistered land. Land in Java is relatively secure, while the distribution
of lproxy in Sumatra suggests that land is more insecure.
Table 4 contains the rst and second moments of the distributions of lambda, as well as
the share of landowners participating on the supply side of the market for ve geographical
regions. It is easy to detect a pattern of high land market participation in regions where
tenure is on average more secure. Land markets are most active in Java, Nusa Tenggara, and
Sulawesi, where land is secure (low average lambda) and the information problem is limited
25Table 2: Dierence-in-Dierence Results for Supply Side Land Market Participation
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
land certicate  2007 indicator 0.297** 0.300** 0.269** 0.279*
(0.130) (0.137) (0.136) (0.142)
land certicate -0.0991 -0.119 -0.101 -0.118
(0.117) (0.122) (0.123) (0.128)
2007 indicator 0.0754 0.0328 0.0874 0.0401
(0.0569) (0.0598) (0.0591) (0.0619)
per capita farmland (log) 0.0293** 0.0496*** 0.0404*** 0.0571***
(0.0145) (0.0156) (0.0151) (0.0163)
head's age 0.0237** 0.0274** 0.0162 0.0243*
(0.0118) (0.0129) (0.0121) (0.0132)
head's age squared -0.000165 -0.000218* -9.10e-05 -0.000185
(0.000121) (0.000131) (0.000123) (0.000133)
head's gender (female = 1) 0.387*** 0.199** 0.452*** 0.238***
(0.0756) (0.0852) (0.0771) (0.0867)
head's years of schooling 0.0596*** 0.0439*** 0.0492*** 0.0367***
(0.00552) (0.00591) (0.00602) (0.00640)
household males 15-60 years -0.0557 -0.0783**
(0.0357) (0.0370)
household females 15-60 years 0.0628* 0.0378
(0.0370) (0.0383)
indicator for ownership of -1.211*** -1.172***
livestock or farm assets (0.0823) (0.0851)
value of farm assets (log) -0.0220* -0.0167
(0.0127) (0.0131)
non-farm business indicator 0.312*** 0.250***
(0.0505) (0.0535)
value of non-farm assets (log) 0.0540*** 0.0456***
(0.0146) (0.0157)
share of household members 0.365*** 0.287***
with o-farm employment (0.0830) (0.0874)
provincial indicators yes yes yes yes
observations 4,219 4,066 4,053 3,911
Notes: Parameter estimates from the probit estimation of equation (6). Standard errors in parentheses.
Single asterisk denotes statistical signicance at the 90% level of condence, double 95%, triple 99%.
Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), calculations by author.
26Table 3: Probit Results for Supply Side Land Market Participation in 2007
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
land certicate 0.169** 0.152** 0.145** 0.136*
(0.0720) (0.0758) (0.0740) (0.0776)
supply side land market 0.645*** 0.569*** 0.640*** 0.578***
participation in 2000 (0.0831) (0.0886) (0.0848) (0.0901)
per capita farmland (log) 0.0414* 0.0653** 0.0427* 0.0603**
(0.0229) (0.0255) (0.0237) (0.0261)
head's age 0.00686** 0.00527* 0.00615** 0.00506*
(0.00269) (0.00286) (0.00277) (0.00293)
head's gender (female = 1) 0.409*** 0.260** 0.467*** 0.293**
(0.103) (0.116) (0.105) (0.117)
head's years of schooling 0.0594*** 0.0386*** 0.0492*** 0.0318***
(0.00776) (0.00842) (0.00837) (0.00900)
household males 15-60 years -0.00525 -0.0347
(0.0484) (0.0502)
household females 15-60 years 0.0651 0.0443
(0.0522) (0.0533)
indicator for ownership of -1.311*** -1.259***
livestock or farm assets (0.120) (0.124)
value of farm assets (log) -0.0302* -0.0218
(0.0182) (0.0186)
non-farm business indicator 0.295*** 0.222***
(0.0704) (0.0746)
value of non-farm assets (log) 0.0584*** 0.0462**
(0.0214) (0.0233)
share of household members 0.345*** 0.255**
with o-farm employment (0.116) (0.123)
provincial indicators yes yes yes yes
observations 2,218 2,146 2,160 2,094
Notes: Parameter estimates from the probit estimation of equation (7). Standard errors in
parentheses. Single asterisk denotes statistical signicance at the 90% level of condence, dou-
ble 95%, triple 99%.
Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), calculations by author.
27(small standard deviation of lambda). The two regions with the least active land markets
among unregistered landowners, Kalimantan and Sumatra, have the most severe average
tenure insecurity as well as the distributions with the most dispersion.
To investigate further, variables can be generated by computing the mean and standard
deviation of lambda in the household's province of residence. The distributions are highly
skewed, and the rst two moments are highly sensitive to outliers. To circumvent this issue,
a transformation of lambda is computed in order to derive a proxy variable for land tenure
security LTSproxy   log(lambda). The distribution of LTSproxy has nicer properties than
the distribution of lambda. The variables LTSproxyMEAN, LTSproxySD, and LTSproxyCV
are generated by computing the mean, standard deviation, and coecient of variation of
LTSproxy in the household's province of residence. Including average tenure security, and
the dispersion of tenure security across plots within each province in the probit models of
land market participation allows Proposition 4.1 to be tested formally. While the coecients
have the appropriate signs (not shown), the signicance levels are low (signicant only at
the 10 percent level) when both variables are included. This is likely because provinces with
low tenure security also tend to suer from high degrees of heterogeneity in land rights.
Instead of including both the mean and the standard deviation, only the coecient of vari-
ation, LTSproxyCV, is included in the probit models. In a given province, heterogeneity of
ownership rights across plots (high LTSproxySD) implies a high LTSproxyCV, and should
limit land market participation according to Proposition 4.1(i). Low average tenure security
(low LTSproxyMEAN) also implies a high LTSproxyCV, and should curb participation in
the land rental and lease markets according to Proposition 4.1(ii).
The probability of supplying unregistered land to the lease market in 2007 is represented







0 + 1LTSproxyCVj + 2y2000i + 3Xi + 4Yi + 5Zi

; (8)
where i indexes households; j indexes provinces; y2007i, y2000i, Xi, Yi, and Zi are dened
28as before; and  is the standard normal distribution function. Table 5 presents the results
for the sample of landowners without legal documentation of ownership. The standard errors
are adjusted to allow for clustering based on the 13 provinces included in the IFLS sample.
Households living in provinces with high LTSproxyCV are much less likely to be conducting
land market transactions. For example, a decrease in the coecient of variation from the
highest to the lowest provincial statistic is associated with an increase in the probability of
supply side land market participation of roughly 8 or 9 percentage points. This is highly
signicant even with farm and non-farm related variables included on the right-hand side.
Since LTSproxyCV is proportional to the standard deviation of the proxy variable and
negatively related to the provincial average degree of tenure security, this result supports
both parts of Proposition 4.1.
Finally, it is of interest to examine the eect of individual tenure security on landowners'
ability to supply land within a regional land market. In the absence of private information
regarding heterogeneous degrees tenure security, one would expect the relationship between
supply side land market participation and the proxy variable lambda to be monotonically
decreasing. To see this, recall that the proxy variable can be broadly interpreted as the
ratio of land productivity to market value. When the price of land is high (lambda is low),
landowners with o-farm economic opportunities are willing to transact. On the other hand,
when the market value of land is too low (lambda is high), households are more likely to
switch from renting out land to autarky. In contrast, if the equilibrium of the model in
Section 2 accurately reects the market for farmland in rural Indonesia, then the most
insecure plots should be more readily sold or rented out. This is because illiquidity is used
as a screening mechanism to identify secure land, since only sellers experiencing a low risk of
land conscation and without unresolved land conicts are willing to accept a low probability
of trade. This is an implication of the theory that is not shared by conventional transaction
cost models of land market liquidity.
29Table 4: Land Market Activity and lambda by Region
share of landowners lambda
REGION supplying land (%) mean std. dev.
Sumatra 14.267 0.238 0.234
Java 18.182 0.162 0.181
Nusa Tenggara 15.194 0.142 0.152
Kalimantan 12.935 0.410 0.296
Sulawesi 22.283 0.204 0.191
All Regions 16.394 0.206 0.204
Source: 2007 Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS4), calculations by
author.
Table 5: Probit Results for Supplying Unregistered Land in 2007
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
LTSproxyCV -1.150*** -1.103*** -1.029** -1.025***
(0.434) (0.404) (0.418) (0.367)
per capita farmland (log) 0.0333 0.0446** 0.0434* 0.0477*
(0.0209) (0.0194) (0.0260) (0.0252)
supply side land market 0.704*** 0.611*** 0.697*** 0.624***
participation in 2000 (0.0851) (0.116) (0.0931) (0.122)
household variables yes yes yes yes
farm variables no yes no yes
non-farm variables no no yes yes
provincial indicators no no no no
observations 1,533 1,479 1,495 1,446
Notes: Parameter estimates from the probit estimation of equation (8). Standard errors
in parentheses. Single asterisk denotes statistical signicance at the 90% level of con-
dence, double 95%, triple 99%. Household variables include head's age, head's gender,
and head's years of schooling. Farm variables include household males and females 15-
60 years, indicator for ownership of livestock or farm assets, and value of farm assets
(log). Non-farm variables include non-farm business indicator, value of non-farm assets
(log), and share of household members with o-farm employment.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Locally weighted scatterplot smoothing, or LOWESS, is applied to the data to describe
this relationship. LOWESS is a technique that uses polynomial regressions to summarize a
bivariate relationship. Figure 2 plots the smoothed probability of supply side land market
participation by the proxy variable for tenure insecurity, lambda, for farming households in
the IFLS sample without land ownership certicates. To remove the eect of long-term
rental contracts, households that leased out land in IFLS3 (2000) are excluded. To account
for dierences in land endowments, the double residual method proposed by Robinson (1988)
is used to control for (log) per capita farmland.
At rst glance, the LOWESS estimation does not appear to support the theory's predic-
tion that the most insecure plots are the most liquid. The theoretical model implies that,
in equilibrium, the relationship between supplying land in the market and lambda should be
positive and monotonic. As Figure 2 shows, this is only the case over some range of lambda,
and there are households at the low end of the distribution that exhibit higher rates of land
market participation. It is worth remarking that the LOWESS modelling technique does
not control for other household characteristics and economic variables that contribute to a
household's ability and willingness to conduct land market transactions. Moreover, there
could be methods11 other than formal land titles by which the owners of secure land can
credibly advertise the security of their ownership. This would explain the higher probability
of land market participation in Figure 2 among landowners with lambda close to zero, while
the screening mechanism proposed here explains the increasing part for lambda 2 [0:2;0:6].
Note that Figure 2 displays the estimation for unregistered landowners from all regions.
Since the results of the probit models with provincial variables suggest that the dierences
in land tenure systems across regions is important in understanding land market activity,
it makes more sense to investigate the relationship between land market participation and
lambda for specic regions. Figures 3 and 4 display the LOWESS smoother for the two
11For example, Besley (1995) suggests that investments in the land, such as planting trees, can enhance
tenure security. It could be that owners with relatively secure property rights nd it worthwhile to invest in
their land as a way of signalling the quality of their ownership rights to potential buyers. Future work will
investigate signalling and screening in land markets where tenure is insecure.
32geographic regions with the highest sample sizes in the IFLS: Java and Sumatra. The
evidence no longer appears to falsify the model's mechanism, as the propensity to supply
land increases for high values of the proxy variable lambda.
This evidence supports illiquidity as a screening mechanism over other theories of land
market inactivity. The proxy variable is roughly the ratio of farm output to market value.
High values of lambda therefore imply highly productive land but with low market value.
In a conventional model of land markets, these are the last people one would expect on the
supply side of a land transaction. The LOWESS estimation reveals that it is precisely these
households at the high end of the lambda distribution that have the highest probability of
supply side land market participation. This empirical trend is dicult to reconcile with other
models, but the theory presented here oers an answer: a landowner would be willing to
sell or lease a productive plot of land for a low market price if tenure is insecure. Moreover,
illiquidity as a screening device explains why a Sumatran plot with lambda = 0:6 is more
likely to be leased out than a plot with lambda = 0:2.
6 Conclusions
This paper proposes a theory to explain the varied levels of activity across land markets
in developing countries in terms of the security of property rights over land. Despite the
discussion of land market thinness in the literature, tenure insecurity in most land market
models either aects the price of land (Feder and Onchan, 1987) or the presence of transaction
costs (Besley, 1995; Deininger and Jin, 2005). In contrast, I construct a model that allows
one to explicitly characterize important aspects of the land market such as the volume of
trade and the likelihood of selling a particular plot. The results show how the number of
land transactions in an economy with an emerging o-farm labour market can be hindered
by tenure insecurity: a characteristic of many property rights regimes over land. Moreover,
when ownership security becomes more varied across plots, the adverse selection problem
worsens and land market activity declines.
33Enhancing tenure security is often cited as a motivation for land titling programs in
developing countries. Land titles allow for the verication of ownership, which reduces the
incidence of land disputes as well as land market transaction costs in general. The availability
of records reduces asymmetric information about ownership and the quality of the land title.
In smallholder farming communities in Indonesia, land registration has endowed land users
with more secure rights and triggered a higher volume of land transfers. The result that
landowners without legal documentation cannot transact land as readily as certied owners
is evidence that tenure insecurity and private information about property rights lead to thin
land markets. Empirically, a novel contribution of this study is the derivation of a proxy
variable for land tenure insecurity, which has traditionally been dicult to measure. This
widened the scope of the study to include parametric and nonparametric analyses of supply
side land participation among unregistered farming households.
Future work could extend the theoretical model to a dynamic setting. Instead of aecting
the probability of a transaction, ineciencies of the land market will aect the time required
to sell or lease. These endogenous transaction frictions will slow down the ow of labour from
agricultural to o-farm activities. Further empirical work could investigate the link between
tenure security, land market activity and the migration patterns of household members in
Indonesia. The IFLS tracked and interviewed individuals who moved or separated from their
original household between surveys. This feature of the IFLS along with the high household
recontact rates make it a promising data source to study the link between land markets
and migration decisions. Finally, in light of the LOWESS estimation results, extending the
framework to investigate both signalling and screening technologies in a land market with
tenure insecurity might explain the high participation rates at both tails of the  distribution.
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38A Proof of Proposition 3.1
It is straightforward to check that these prices and allocations satisfy the equilibrium con-
ditions 1, 2, and 3. Claim 1 establishes that the proposed prices, allocations, and utilities
satisfy the equilibrium renement. Lemma 1 shows that there cannot exist a pooling sub-
market. Finally, Claims 2, 3, and 4 establish uniqueness.
Claim 1 The prices, allocations, and utilities in Proposition 3.1 satisfy the equilibrium
renement.
Proof. Consider all possible deviations, p0 2 R+nP. If p0 > (1   H)   c = pH, the
payo to the buyer in a land transaction is negative. If p0 < (1   L)   c = pL, no seller
will enter the new submarket since submarket pL is strictly preferred. Finally, consider
p0 2 ((1 L) c;(1 H) c). Let  denote the buyer-seller ratio in the new submarket
p0. Type L sellers are attracted to the new submarket if
minf;1g(p
0   L)  (1   L)   L   c =  UL
)  
(1   L)   L   c
p0   L
 L
Similarly, type H sellers are attracted to the new submarket if
minf;1g(p
0   H) 
(1   L)   L   c
(1   H)   L   c

(1   H)   H   c

)  
[(1   L)   L   c][(1   H)   H   c]
[(1   H)   L   c][p0   H]
 H
One can rank the cut-os L and H dened above for any p0 2 ((1 L) c;(1 H) c).
L =
(1   L)   L   c
p0   L
?
[(1   L)   L   c][(1   H)   H   c]





(1   H)   H   c
(1   H)   L   c
Let p0 = [(1   L)   c] + (1   )[(1   H)   c] ) p0 = (1   H)   c   (L   H),
39 2 (0;1). The inequality from above becomes
(1   H)   H   c   (L   H)
(1   H)   L   c   (L   H)
<
(1   H)   H   c
(1   H)   L   c
and the inequality is strict for any  2 (0;1). This establishes L < H for any new submarket
p0 2 ((1   L)   c;(1   H)   c). Since type H sellers correctly anticipate that type L
sellers will enter submarket p0 until the buyer-seller ratio is L, the type H sellers choose not
to enter. Since the deviation p0 > (1   L)   c attracts only sellers of insecure land, the
deviation is not protable.
Lemma 1 There are no submarkets that attract both type L and type H sellers in any
competitive land market equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose (for the sake of contradiction) that there exists a submarket with price p
that attracts sL(p) type L sellers and sH(p) type H sellers. The type-dependent utilities are














and buyers in submarket p earn a payo of zero in expectation because of the free entry








 c. Consider a deviation
to p0 2 (p;(1   H)   c). Let  again denote the buyer-seller ratio in the new submarket.
A type L seller prefers the new submarket if
minf;1g(p











































which is low enough that the new submarket makes type L sellers worse o. Consequently,
the deviation attracts only type H sellers, which yields a positive payo to the buyer since
p0 < (1   H) + c and  < 1.
Lemma 2 In any competitive land market equilibrium, there is a submarket pL 2 P with
sL(pL) > 0.
Proof. Suppose (for the sake of contradiction) that there is no such submarket, and therefore
sL(p) = 0 for all p 2 P and  UL = 0. A subset of buyers can oer pL = L +  with  > 0
close to zero. All potential type L sellers will choose to enter the market since pL   L > 0.
The expected payo to buyers in the new submarket is at least (1  L)  L    c (even
higher if H types enter the submarket as well). With  small enough, this payo becomes
arbitrarily close to (1   L)   L   c, which is strictly positive by Assumption 2.
Claim 2 In any competitive land market equilibrium,  UL = (1   L)   L   c, and there
is a submarket with price pL = (1   L)   c.
Proof. By Lemma 2, there is some pL 2 P with sL(pL) > 0 such that






(pL   L)  0
Suppose (for the sake of contradiction) that  UL 6= (1   L)   L   c. First, suppose







(pL   L)  (pL   L)
41this can only occur if pL > (1   L)   c. Any transaction involving type L land in a
submarket with price pL > (1   L)   c will yield a negative payo to the buyer. This
is a contradiction since, according to Lemma 1, there can only be one type of seller in an
equilibrium submarket.
Suppose then that  UL < (1   L)   L   c. Since it's already been established that
pL  (1 L) c, then either b(pL)=sL(pL) < 1 or pL < (1 L) c. If b(pL)=sL(pL) < 1,
then the buyers' free entry condition implies pL = (1 L) c. A buyer can post a deviating
oer p = pL   , with  > 0 small enough that some type L sellers prefer the new oer:











Since the deviating oer attracts sellers and involves a smaller payment for land, the devia-
tion is protable.
If pL < (1   L)   c, consider the deviating oer p 2 (pL;(1   L)   c). Since
p   L > pL   L   UL
some type L sellers prefer the new submarket. Moreover, since p < (1   L)   c, the
deviation is protable. This completes the proof that  UL = (1   L)   L   c. Moreover,
the possibility that pL 6= (1   L)   c has been ruled out.
Lemma 3 In any competitive land market equilibrium, there is a submarket pH 2 P with
sH(pH) > 0.
Proof. Suppose (for the sake of contradiction) that there is no such submarket, and therefore
sH(p) = 0 for all p 2 P and  UH = 0. A subset of buyers can oer any pH = (1 H) c ,
42with  > 0 close to zero. Type L sellers will prefer the new submarket if
minf;1g(pH   L)  (1   L)   L   c =  UL
)  
(1   H)   L   c
(1   L)   L   c   
 L
For  close to zero, L < 1. Type H sellers will enter the new submarket, since
L(pH   H) =
(1   H)   L   c
(1   L)   L   c   
[(1   H)   H   c   ] > 0
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 2 and  small. Since type L sellers
correctly anticipate that type H sellers will enter submarket pH until the buyer-seller ratio
is below L, the type L sellers choose not to enter. Since the deviation attracts only sellers
of secure land and pH < (1   H)   c, the deviation is protable.
Claim 3 In any competitive land market equilibrium,
 UH =

(1   L)   L   c
(1   H)   L   c

(1   H)   H   c

and there is a submarket with pH = (1   H)   c.
Proof. By Lemma 3, there is some pH 2 P with sH(pH) > 0 such that






(pH   H)  0





[(1   H)   H   c].





[(1   H)   H   c]. Then,









(1   L)   L   c
(1   H)   L   c
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(1   L)   L   c
(1   H)   L   c





From Claim 2,  UL = (1 L) L c. Condition 2(ii) of the equilibrium denition requires














(1   L)   L   c
pH   L
(A.2)
Combining (A.1) and (A.2) gives

(1   L)   L   c
(1   H)   L   c





(1   L)   L   c
pH   L
This reduces to
pH > (1   H)   c
Any transaction at pH > (1   H)   c yields a negative payo to the buyer, which contra-
dicts the equilibrium free entry condition for buyers.





[(1   H)   H   c], so either pH < (1 H)  c
or b(pH)=sH(pH) <
(1 L) L c
(1 H) L c. If pH < (1   H)   c, the buyers' free entry condition
implies b(pH)=sH(pH) > 1. The type L seller's equilibrium condition 2(ii) requires
pH   L  pL   L =  UL ) pH  pL
This is a contradiction since it means either a single submarket for both types, or if the
inequality is strict, that type H sellers would prefer the type L submarket.
If b(pH)=sH(pH) <
(1 L) L c
(1 H) L c, the buyers' free entry condition implies pH = (1 H) c.




(pH   H)  pL   H
b(pH)
sH(pH)





(1   L)   H   c
(1   H)   H   c
(A.3)
Consider the deviating oer p() = (1 )pL+pH,  2 (0;1). The new oer can be written
p() = (1   )(1   L) + (1   H)   c = (1   L)   c + (L   H)
Type H sellers prefer the new oer as long as




minf;1g[(1   L)   H   c + (L   H)] 
b(pH)
sH(pH)





(1   H)   H   c
(1   L)   H   c + (L   H)

 H (A.4)
Similarly, type L sellers prefer the new submarket if
minf;1g(p()   L)  pL   L =  UL
minf;1g[(1   L)   L   c + (L   H)]  (1   L)   L   c
) minf;1g 
(1   L)   L   c
(1   L)   L   c + (L   H)
 L (A.5)
The new oer p() yields a positive expected payo to the deviating buyer if H < L and
H  1: only type H sellers enter the new market if H < L; the buyer makes a purchase
with probability one if H  1; and since p() < pH = (1   H)   c, there is a strictly
positive payo to the buyer in a transaction. From the denition of L in (A.5), one can see
that L < 1. The necessary condition for a contradiction is therefore H < L. As before,





(1   H)   H   c
(1   L)   H   c + (L   H)

?
(1   L)   L   c




(1   H)   H   c
(1   L)   L   c

?
(1   L)   H   c + (L   H)
(1   L)   L   c + (L   H)





(1   L)   H   c
(1   H)   H   c
;
(1   L)   L   c
(1   H)   L   c

Denote the particular buyer-seller ratio in submarket pH by the convex combination
() = (1   )

(1   L)   H   c




(1   L)   L   c
(1   H)   L   c

with  2 [0;1). Substituting this into the inequality above yields
(1   )

(1   L)   H   c




(1   H)   H   c
(1   H)   L   c

?
(1   L)   H   c + (L   H)
(1   L)   L   c + (L   H)
(A.6)
The left-hand side of (A.6) is a monotonic function of ,
L : [0;1] !

(1   L)   H   c
(1   L)   L   c
;
(1   H)   H   c
(1   H)   L   c

Similarly, the right-hand side of (A.6) is a monotonic function of ,
R : [0;1] !

(1   L)   H   c
(1   L)   L   c
;
(1   H)   H   c
(1   H)   L   c

By the intermediate value theorem, for any left-hand side value evaluated at  2 [0;1], there
46is a  2 [0;1] such that L() = R(). Since R() is strictly increasing, for any  2 [0;1),
there is a  2 (0;1) such that L() < R(). This means that a protable deviating oer is
always possible. This completes the proof that
 UH =

(1   L)   L   c
(1   H)   L   c

(1   H)   H   c

Moreover, the possibility that pH 6= (1   H)   c has been ruled out.
Claim 4 In any competitive land market equilibrium, sL(pL) = SL, b(pL) = SL, sH(pH) =
SH, and
b(pH) =
(1   L)   L   c
(1   H)   L   c
SH
Proof. Claim 2 and the denition of  UL,







imply b(pL)  sL(pL). However, b(pL) > sL(pL) violates the free entry condition for buyers,
so it must be that b(pL) = sL(pL). Since  UL > 0, equilibrium condition 2(ii) requires that
all type L sellers enter the land market, sL(pL) = SL.
Claim 3 and the denition of  UH imply
b(pH) =
(1   L)   L   c
(1   H)   L   c
sH(pH)
With  UH > 0, all type H sellers enter the land market, sH(pH) = SH.
By Claims 2, 3, and 4, the unique competitive land market equilibrium is characterized by
the proposed prices, allocations of buyers and sellers across submarkets, and type-dependent
payos.
47B Comparative Statics and Eciency Results
It is convenient to introduce some additional notation. Let L =  + " and H =    ".
Then the system of property rights over land can be summarized by the two parameters:
unweighted average tenure insecurity, , and a measure of the dispersion with respect to
the quality of land titles, ". Let L and H denote the share of type i sellers trading in
equilibrium, i 2 fL;Hg. Then L(;") = 1, and
H(;") =

(1      ")   L(;")   c
(1    + ")   L(;")   c

where
L(;") = maxf(1      ");(1      ")   (w
U   w
R)g
In order to derive useful comparative statics results, it is useful to rst state the following:
Lemma 4 Let L =  + " and H =    ". The fraction of type H sellers trading in
equilibrium, H, is continuous in  and ".
Proof of Lemma 4
Let (;") be any pair (;") satisfying wU wR = (1 )(1  "). It is straightforward
to check that
lim
(;")!(;")  H(;") = lim
(;")!(;")+ H(;") = H(
;"
)
Since H(;") is also continuous o the boundary, H is a continuous function.
Proof of Proposition 4.1(i)
Let L = +" and H =  ", and analyze the impact of a change in .12 Proposition 4.1(i)
holds if the number of type H land transactions, HSH, declines with . Dierentiating H
12This is a way of increasing the is in manner that preserves the degree of heterogeneity in the quality
of land titles. Otherwise it would be impossible to separate the eect of the land tenure insecurity problem
and the the eect of heterogeneity.








[(1    + ")   (1      ")   c]
2 < 0 if w
U   w
R  (1   )(1      ")
0 if w
U   w
R < (1   )(1      ")
Therefore, if wU   wR < (1   )(1      "), an increase in  does not aect activity in the
land market. The cut-o (1   )(1      ") decreasing in  implies that as  increases, at
some point wU  wR = (1 )(1  ") and the buyer-seller ratio in the type H submarket
declines, reducing the total number of land transactions.
Proof of Proposition 4.1(ii)
Let L =  + " and H =    ", with " > 0, and analyze the eect of ", since an increase in
" represents greater heterogeneity in the quality of land market titles. Proposition 4.1(iii)
holds if the number of type H land transactions, HSH, declines with ". Dierentiating H





> > > <
> > > :
 2 [(1   )(1   )   c]
[(1    + ")   (1      ")   c]
2 < 0 if w
U   w
R  (1   )(1      ")
 2

wU   wR   c

[wU   wR + 2"   c]
2 < 0 if w
U   w
R < (1   )(1      ")
This establishes the result that the number of type H land transactions declines with ".
Proof of Proposition 4.2
To determine whether a Pareto improving market intervention is possible given the asym-
metric information in the land market, consider an allocation that treats all landowner types
identically, regardless of the level tenure security associated with their plot. The number of
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Type L sellers prefer the pooling allocation over the competitive land market equilibrium if
 UP










   L   c > (1   L)   L   c
The inequality is satised because L > H. Type L sellers prefer the pooling allocation
because the price is higher than the market price for type L land. In addition, there is no
trade-o in terms of market liquidity for type L sellers, since type L land is perfectly liquid
even in the market equilibrium.
Type H sellers may or may not prefer the pooling allocation. Their preference for the
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(1   H)   H   c
(1   H)   L   c
Type H sellers prefer the price of land in the type H equilibrium submarket over the price
of land in under the pooling regime. However, type H land is perfectly liquid in the pool-
ing regime, but not in equilibrium. The greater eciency in trade outweighs the cost of
subsidizing type L sellers as long as there is not too much insecure land in the economy.
50Proof of Proposition 4.3
Land market transactions take place as long as there are gains from trade, taking into
account illiquidity and buyers' cost of entering the land market. With wU   wR xed, an
economy starting from a case 3 environment will eventually switch to a case 2 environment
as  increases, and then to a case 1. This is because rural residents develop greater incentives
to accept urban job oers as the land tenure problem worsens. Proposition 4.3 then asserts
that a case 1 land market will break down as  increases further.
Te surplus to a seller is p   (1   i), and the surplus to the buyer is (1   i)   p,
i 2 fL;Hg. The total surplus of a type i land market transaction, including the entry cost,
is therefore (1 )(1 i) c. A land market exists only if (1 )(1 L)  c. Suppose
that (1   )(1   L) < c. If (1   )(1   H) < c, there are no gains from trading either
type of land plot. Instead, if (1 )(1 H)  c > (1 )(1 L), the land market shuts
down entirely even though there remain gains from trading type H land because buyers can
non longer screen for the type L land. Type L sellers will be attracted to the type H market,
and potential buyers, anticipating this outcome, choose not to enter. With L =  + " and
H =    ", the land market shuts down whenever
(1   )(1      ") < c )  >
(1   ")(1   )   c
(1   )
51C Deriving the Proxy Variable for Tenure Insecurity
The degree of tenure security associated with a particular plot is unobservable. It is precisely
this hidden information that renders land illiquid in order for potential buyers to distinguish
the ownership rights associated with a vendor's plot. Although private information makes
it dicult for econometric analysis, a proxy variable can be backed out of the IFLS data
which, according to the theory, is correlated with tenure insecurity (the is). Recall from
the model that the price of a plot of land before transaction costs is
pi = (1   i) (C.1)
The analogous pricing equation in an innite horizon framework is
pi;t =  + (1   i)Et[pi;t+1] (C.2)
where t indexes time, and  is the discount factor. Equation (C.2) can be rearranged









1   (1   i)
(C.3)
The value of insecure land (i.e., land with a high ) is lower because future farm output is
discounted according to the risk of expropriation. Figure 5 plots the densities of the log of
self-reported value per hectare of household land separately for registered and unregistered
land to see if this might be true in the data. On average, the perceived value of unregistered
land is less than the value of land when ownership is secured by land certicates.13
The  in equations (C.2) and (C.3) is broadly interpreted as land rent. If we assume
that i;t for household i at time t is a function of farm assets ki;t, labour endowments ni;t,
13This is not the only interpretation. For example, if land diers in terms of soil quality, it may be that
owners of poor quality land do not nd it worthwhile to obtain a certicate. However, the property rights
explanation becomes more plausible when I compare the ratio of the land value to annual farm output and
nd that the relationship still holds.
52and landholdings li;t, we can express land rent as (ki;t;ni;t;li;t). Moreover, if factor inputs
and land rent are relatively stable over time, then
pi =
(ki;ni;li)
1   (1   i)
(C.4)
and a proxy variable for  can be dened as




if the discount factor  is close to one.
In the IFLS, farming households were asked to estimate the market value of their land,
and to report their annual farm output. To recover a variable representing land rent, the
contributions of farm assets and labour must rst be subtracted from farm output. To do








ai is farm output for household i; li, ni, and ki are land, labour, and capital used by household
i; and exp(A) is total factor productivity. Taking the logarithms of both sides of (C.6) gives
an equation that can be estimated by ordinary least squares:
logai = A + k logki + n logni + l logli + i (C.7)
Estimates of the wage rate and rental rate on capital are obtained using marginal products:
w = ^ n a= n and rk = ^ k a= k (C.8)
where  a,  n, and  k are the average levels of farm output, employment, agricultural capital
53stock. Land's contribution to farm output can be written
(ki;ni;li) = ai   wni   rkki (C.9)
which can be calculated from the data using farm output, farm labour endowment, and
farm assets. Plugging this into the numerator of (C.5) and the reported land value into
the denominator yields a proxy variable for i. Notice that  is computed using ai and
not the tted values from the production function estimation since the unexplained part
of agricultural output likely reects undocumented land characteristics such as soil quality
and topography. Then, according to equation (C.5), any unobserved characteristics that
aect land productivity (the numerator) will also be reected in the value of the land (the
denominator). In the construction of lambda, these eects will cancel out, so that the proxy
variable is less sensitive to land characteristics such as soil quality and topography. Any
factor that inuences the perceived value of a plot of land without aecting annual farm
output will however generate misleading lambda values. I therefore remove the eect of
proximity to the provincial capital center on reported land values before constructing the
proxy variable.14
According to the theory, lambda is an estimate of i. If this procedure truly generates
a reasonable proxy variable, one would expect lambda to be distributed between 0 and 1.
Moreover, since even a small probability of losing ownership in a given year reects a substan-
tial amount of insecurity, most of the mass should be located close to zero. Figure 6 displays
the kernel density of the derived proxy variable, lambda. The distribution is as expected.
14The log of the reported value per hectare of land, log vi, is regressed on a constant and the distance from
the provincial capital center, di:
logvi = 0 + 1di + i
The estimated coecient on the distance variable, ^ 1 is negative and signicant at the 1 percent level.
Then, the adjusted total land value used to construct the proxy variable for tenure insecurity is adjusted
based on the proximity to the provincial capital center:
lambdai 
yi   wni   rkki
exp
 
logvi   ^ 1(di    d)

 li



























































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: The kernel density estimation of the per






































































































































































































Figure 6: The kernel density estimation of the proxy
variable for tenure insecurity, lambda
55D Model Extension: Heterogeneous Productivity
There are countless potential forces generating the demand for land ownership transferability
in rural agricultural economies. In the main part of the paper, I chose to model the land
market in an environment where a fraction of landowners receive opportunities to work
more productively in a modern sector. The emerging o-farm economy and migration ows
spur land market activity. Another possible driver could be heterogeneity in land user
productivities, which generates incentives to transfer land to the most productive workers.
Instead of an emerging o-farm economy, suppose households are subject to productivity
shocks. In particular, assume that with probability q, a household switches from high to low
productivity. This interpretation of the model is consistent with some of the land market
literature that derives a demand for land transferability from heterogeneous productivity
(Besley, 1995; Yao, 2000; Deininger and Jin, 2005) or from heterogeneous household resources
and endowments (Skouas, 1995).
Let a 2 faL;aHg be the random productivity variable. High productivity landowners earn
prot aH, and low productivity households earn aL. Normalize aH = 1 and aL =  < 1.
The negative productivity shock can be interpreted, for example, as a shock to a household's
labour endowment, or as a health shock that impedes a landowner from making full use of his
land. Before agricultural production takes place, there are incentives for land transactions
driven by the potential gains from transferring land from low to high productivity owners. A
buyer's payo in a land market transaction involving type i land for price p is (1 i)  p.
A type i seller's gain from a land transaction is p   (1   i).
I make the same simplifying assumptions as in the previous sections. There are only two
types of land plots, and L > H. The short side of the market matches with probability
one. The measure of highly productive landless agents is enough to ensure that the free
entry conditions hold in equilibrium. This requires q < 1   nL   nH. Finally, assume that
the gains from trade are positive for both types of land. A sucient condition is that the
entry cost c is arbitrarily small.
56Proposition D.1 There exists a unique competitive land market equilibrium with
(i) land prices: pL = (1   L)   c and pH = (1   H)   c
(ii) seller allocations: fsL(pL);sL(pH)g = fSL;0g and fsH(pL);sH(pH)g = f0;SHg
(iii) buyer allocation: b(pL) = SL and b(pH) =
(1   )(1   L)   c
(1   H)   (1   L)   c
SH.
(iv) utilities for type i sellers:






(1   )(1   H)   c

There is only one type of equilibrium, which is similar to a case 1 equilibrium in the
benchmark model with migration decisions. According to part (iii) of Proposition D.1,
the asymmetric information induces illiquidity in the type H land market as a screening
mechanism. All of the results from Section 4 apply to the extended model as well. Namely,
higher degrees of tenure insecurity reduce the volume of transactions in the land market.
A poor functioning land market aects aggregate farm production. Increased land trans-
ferability and reduced tenure insecurity are associated empirically with productivity gains.
For example, Holden, Deininger, and Ghebru (2007) nd that land rental markets in Ethiopia
transfer land to more productive households. There are unexploited productivity gains, how-
ever, as they document the existence of barriers that constrain participation in the Ethiopian
rental markets, which are likely related to tenure insecurity and the threat of land cons-
cation. The model extension captures the Ethiopian experience. Land market deciencies
reduce aggregate output because land cannot always be transferred to more productive users.
Reducing frictions in the land market improves land allocative eciency and increases ag-
gregate output.
57